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The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Of Privileges and the 
Divison of Rule-Making Power 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1961, a Special Committee on Evidence, appointed by Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, returned a report recommending the adoption 
of uniform rules of evidence for the federal courts. 1 Consequently, 
on March 8, 1965, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules of Evidence. In March of 1969 the first draft of the 
rules was finished and circulated to the bar and bench,2 whose criti-
cism and comments resulted in revised drafts in March 1971;3 Octo-
ber 1971;4 and November 1972.5 The November draft was approved 
by the Court and sent to Congress as the Court's Proposed Rules.6 
Under the Rules Enabling Act,7 these rules would have taken 
effect automatically had Congress not acted within ninety days. 
However, in early 1973, Congress, responding to the controversy and 
criticism triggered by the Proposed Rules, acted to prevent the Rules 
from becoming effective. 8 Both houses of Congress then drafted 
their own rules which, while based on the Proposed Rules, revised 
I. Special Committee on Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Prelimi-
nary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of .Developing Un!form Rules of Evidence for the 
Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 79, ll4-17 (1961). 
2. Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 
(1969). 
3. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971). 
4. See P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 2, 8. n.4 
(Supp. 1975). 
5. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). 
6. Id. at 184. 
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). It provides: 
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of 
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district 
courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and 
maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in proceedings for the 
review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United States and for 
the judicial review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commis-
sions, and officers. 
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall pre-
serve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amend-
ment to the Constitution. 
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief 
Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day 
of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported. 
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules 
have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding, 
shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the 
Supreme Court. 
8. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. 
1177 
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them in several major respects. A compromise reached by the two 
houses produced the present Federal Rules of Evidence for United 
States Courts and Magistrates, which were enacted on January 2, 
1975.9 
Article V, the section on privileges, provoked the greatest dissen-
sion and underwent the greatest change. 10 Three kinds of issues 
were involved. First, the Proposed Rules were to apply to diversity-
of-citizenship as well as federal-question cases. But many Congress-
men, heeding the federalism concerns articulated in Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, 11 feared that this choice-of-law decision was unconstitu-
tional.12 Second, a dispute between those supporting and those op-
posing codification of the common-law evidence rules was most 
intense in the privilege area. 13 Finally, each privilege which was in-
cluded or excluded was important to one or more special interest 
groups, and these groups lobbied vigorously. 
The Proposed Rules on privileges contained thirteen rules 14 
which codified nine specific privileges15 and a general provision that 
only those enumerated privileges were to be recognized in the fed-
eral courts. 16 However, to avoid a stalemate on the entire set of 
rules, Congress replaced these thirteen rules with one general rule, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States 
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted 
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. 
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element 
of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of deci-
sion, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political 
subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law. 17 
9. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
10. As Representative Hungate remarked, "Without doubt, the privilege section of the 
rules of evidence generated more comment or controversy than any other section. I would say 
that 50 percent of the complaints received by the Criminal Justice Subcommittee related to the 
privilege section." 120 CoNG. REC. 40891 (1974). 
I 1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
12. See text at notes 101-04 iefra. 
13. See text at notes 117-25 iefra. 
14. Proposed Rules 501-513, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-60 (1972). 
15. See Proposed Rules 502 (state-required reports), 503 (attorney-client relationship), 504 
(psychotherapist-patient relationship), 505 (spouses), 506 (clergyman-parishioner relationship), 
507 (voters), 508 (trade secrets), 509 (state secrets), & 510 (identity of informer), 56 F.R.D. at 
234-55. 
16. Proposed Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. at 230. This rule applied not only to federal-question 
cases but also to diversity-of-citizenship cases where state substantive law would apply. See 
Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. at 232. 
17. FED. R. Evm. 501. 
June 1978) Proposed Rules of Evidence 1179 
Congress, that is, returned the privilege problem to the courts 
with little guidance. In addition, Congress limited the Supreme 
Court's authority to make rules in the privilege area so that any 
amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence "creating, abolishing, 
or modifying a privilege shall have no force or effect unless it shall 
be approved by act of Congress." 18 
Historically, making rules of procedure for the federal courts has 
been a joint enterprise of the Supreme Court and Congress. 19 Con-
gress's rejection of the Proposed Rules and its unprecedented action 
fn the privilege area presents the courts with a dilemma unique in 
the jurisprudential history of the United States.20 What authority, if 
any, should the courts give the Proposed Rules in deciding privilege 
issues? The Supreme Court has not yet resolved this dilemma, and 
divergent answers by the lower federal co~rts21 have produced a lack 
of uniformity that threatens the effectiveness of the privileges which 
the federal courts had recognized before the Proposed Rules. Fur-
thermore, the commentators have been singularly unhelpful to the 
courts, since they have failed to provide the courts with an analysis 
of the sources of the rule-making power. Even Judge Weinstein, 
whose otherwise admirable book might usefully have discussed the 
problem, contents himself with assumptions rather than analysis 
when he treats this issue.22 
This Note proposes that the lower federal courts accord the same 
binding authority to the Proposed Rules that they give those judi-
cially promulgated procedural rules, such as the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, that have been implicitly approved by Congress.23 
Part I of the Note analyzes the constitutional division of the rule-
making power by examining both the policy considerations involved 
and the relevant constitutional language and doctrines. That exami-
nation indicates that the power to establish such rules is shared by 
Congress and the Supreme Court. To determine when that power is 
appropriately exercised by one branch rather than the other, the 
18. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2(a){l), 88 Stat. 1948 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2076 (1976)). 
19. See text at notes 58-79 in.fro. 
20. It is true that rule SOi's directive to interpret common-law principles "in the light of 
reason and experience," see text at note 17 supra, also appears in rule 26 of the original 
version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 327 U.S. 821, 852 (1946). However, the 
language of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was promulgated by the Court, not legis-
latively imposed. Thus, that situation differs in that the courts had not relied on different rules 
prior to a legislative reversal, nor had there been a legislative reversal of judicial action. 
21. See text at notes 133-45 in.fro. 
22. J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 89-90 (1977). {A 
shorter version of this work is Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rule-Making Procedures, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1976).) For a detailed discussion of Judge Weinstein's analysis, see note 
42 in.fro. 
23. See note 133 in.fro and accompanying text. 
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Note turns to an analogous area of shared power, the power to define 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This analogy suggests that a 
"primarily adjudicative" test should be consulted to allocate rule-
making power between the two branches. Part I concludes by dem-
onstrating that this test best explains the history of federal judicial 
rule-making. 
Part II explores the development of the federal law of evidence. 
The early stages of that development suggest the propriety of using 
the "primarily adjudicative" test for the specific area of evidence 
rules. That test is then applied through an analysis of the intent be-
hind the congressional treatment of the Proposed Rules, and it is 
concluded that the Proposed Rules are binding on the lower courts. 
Part III surveys the present confused state of federal rules of priv-
ilege and argues that they must be uniform if they are to be effective. 
Only by heeding the "primarily adjudicative" test and treating the 
Proposed Rules as binding authority can the present disuniformity 
be ended and the rules be rescued from uselessness. 
l. THE PRIMARILY ADJUDICATIVE TEST FOR ALLOCATING THE 
POWER To MAKE RULES BETWEEN THE COURTS AND 
CONGRESS 
Because the Constitution does not explicitly refer to the power to 
establish procedural rules for the courts, the inquiry regarding its 
allocation must turn to such considerations as the function of such 
rules and to inferences from the Constitution and from the historical 
practice of Congress and the Court. At the heart of the inquiry is a 
separation-of-powers problem. This Note argues that the authority 
to make rules is shared and that the test for its allocation in a given 
situation is the following "primarily adjudicative" test: If the pri-
mary function of a rule is to facilitate adjudication, then the power 
to make that rule is judicial; if its primary function is non-adjudica-
tive, then the power is legislative. 
A. Policy Considerations 
Both the judicial and legislative branches have a significant inter-
est in writing rules of procedure for the courts.24 The courts have an 
interest because rules of procedure affect how courts work as well as 
the results they reach.25 Thus, early in this century, Dean Wigmore 
and Dean Pound argued that the rule-making power should be ex-
clusively judicial.26 Central to that argument was the courts' 
24. For a discussion of these interests in the context of the privilege rules, see text at notes 
87-91 i'!fra. 
25. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468-69 (1964). 
26. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 
ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928); Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926) •. 
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firsthand knowledge of their own needs and problems.27 Yet Con-
gress has an interest in preventing the substantive effects of rules of 
procedure from conflicting with the aims of legislation. 28 Further-
more, rules of procedure are often designed to serve social policy 
goals external to the working of the court system. 29 Such goals are 
outside the firsthand knowledge of the judiciary. Not only does 
meeting these goals involve policy decisions more appropriately left 
to the legislature, but Congress, with its extensive staff and its inves-
tigative powers,30 is better equipped to make such decisions. In 
short, the policy considerations suggest that both branches need to 
share the rule-making power. 
B. Constitutional Considerations: The Rule Against Advisory 
Opinions 
Although the Constitution does not mention the power to pro-
mulgate rules of procedure for the courts, two of its sections have 
been interpreted as containing implicit but conflicting references to 
that power. Article I, section 8, clause 9, grants Congress the power 
"to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." Because 
this clause has been read as giving Congress substantial power over 
the procedures of the lower federal courts, 31 it could arguably be 
taken to give the power to establish rules of judicial procedure. 
However, article III, section 1, states, "The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish." If establishing rules of judicial procedure is inherent in 
'judicial power," this section vests rule-making power in the judici-
ary.32 Thus, a textual analysis of the Constitution is not inconsistent 
with the conclusion reached above that the rule-making power must 
be shared between the branches. 
Both advocated exclusively judicial control over rule-making, but as Dean Pound conceded, 
"It may be that today, after seventy-five years of codes and practice acts and prolific procedu-
ral legislation, we can't go so far as to pronounce such legislative interference with the opera-
tions of a coordinate department to be unconstitutional." Id at 601. 
27. See Pound, supra note 26, at 602; Wigmore, supra note 26, at 278. 
28. An extreme example is that a rule precluding the admission into evidence of events 
occurring more than six months prior to trial would alter the intended effect of a longer statute 
of limitations. 
29. See text at notes 87-91 infra .. 
30. While special advisory committees have investigative abilities, they are not an inherent 
part of the judiciary, and their existence is more the exception than the rule. The courts' 
function is, after all, judicial, not administrative. q: Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 
(1793) (refusing to involve the courts in administrative functions); Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. 
Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945) (striking down a lower 
court order that a special master investigate the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of a 
complaint, as investigation is not a judicial function). 
31. See notes 46-47 infra and accompanying text. 
32. See text following note 45 infra. 
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There is no direct evidence of the framers' intent regarding which 
branch should make rules of procedure for the courts-neither the 
Federalist Papers nor the debates at the Constitutional Convention 
addressed the issue.33 Because the English courts of 1789, which 
were the model for the American court system, had the power to 
establish such rules,34 it may be inferred that the framers intended 
that American courts do so. 35 But this inference appears to conflict 
with interpretations of several statutes enacted by the first Con-
gress,36 in which sat many of the men who had written the Constitu-
tion.37 
Despite this apparent conflict, however, a constitutionally 
granted independent judicial power over rule-making is necessary if 
the Court's past rule-making is to be reconciled with the rule against 
advisory opinions. The rule against advisory opinions38 is based on 
the separation-of-powers doctrine that the courts should exercise 
only 'judicial" power,39 a power the Supreme Court has defined as 
the "application of principles of law and equity to [the] facts" of a 
33. See Note, Separation of Powers and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 
1059, 1062-63 (1975). 
34. See Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL, L. REV. 163, 
170-73 (1915); Pound, supra note 26, at 601. 
For a broad compilation of the English courts' actions in the rule-making area, see W. 
TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH (3d ed. 1803). These early decisions 
barely considered the theoretical basis for such rule-making. Usually the courts were deciding 
that they had power to make their own rules of evidence for cases in which foreign evidence 
rules were the alternative. See, e.g., Clark v. Mullick, 13 Eng. Rep. 106 (P.C. 1840); Brown v. 
Thornton, 112 Eng. Rep. 70 (K.B. 1837). On the other hand, in Rex v. Ellis, 108 Eng. Rep. 406 
(K.B. 1826), the Court upheld judicial rule-making power against a direct challenge to it. 
More common, however, were cases in which a court simply decided an evidence question 
with no analysis of its power to do so. See, e.g., Wright v. Tatham, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 
1838), and Rouch v. Great W.R.R., 113 Eng. Rep. 1049 (Q.B. 1841) (freely deciding hear-
say questions); Wilson v. Rastall, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1792) (the attorney-client privilege 
is the only one recognized by courts); the unnamed case from Y.B. Pasch 10 Jae., 123 Eng. 
Rep. 656 (C.P. 1613) (a wife may not be compelled to testify against her husband). 
35. As Dean Pound concluded in his analysis of English rule-making: "[l]f anything was 
received from England as a part of our institutions, it was that the making of these general 
rules of practice was a judicial function." Pound, supra note 26, at 601. 
36. See notes 62-64 iefra and accompanying text. 
37. Since many of the political leaders who drafted the Constitution sat in the first Con-
gress, their actions should reflect their belief as to where the Constitution placed the rule-
making power. For a similar argument, see C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 97-98 (2d ed. 1935). 
38. The rule was first articulated in 1793, when the Supreme Court refused to answer ques-
tions posed by President Washington on the effect of the European war on American treaties 
with European countries. Letter from Chief Justice John Jay to President George Washington 
(Aug. 8, 1793), reprinted in J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 170 n.145. Since then, the Court 
has consistently reaffirmed the rule. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1976); Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936); Federal 
Radio Commn. v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 
346 (1911); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 
(1803). 
39. See Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1793). 
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particular case.40 In short, the rule states that deciding a question 
outside of an actual case or controversy is beyond the judicial 
power.41 Since rule-making occurs by definition outside a case or 
controversy, it fails to meet that test. One possible resolution of the 
apparent conflict between judicial rule-making and that prohibition 
is the theory that a congressional delegation of power to the Court 
circumvents the rule. According to this argument, the rule-making 
power is vested in the legislative branch but can be delegated to the 
judiciary.42 But because the rule against advisory opinions is a con-
stitutional one,43 Congress cannot circumvent it-since Rayburn's 
Case44 in 1793, the Court has consistently refused to allow Congress 
to do so.45 
40. Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974). 
41. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937). 
42. Judge Weinstein argues that the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence 
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, acted pursuant to power delegated by Congress. J. WEIN-
STEIN, supra note 22, at 89-96. Although he observes that early experiences with the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, "underlined the courts' inherent procedural and rule powers" 
and that the "contemporary attitude [was] that implied power to design court procedures 
rested in the courts as well as Congress," id. at 57, he concludes that the rule-making power 
has become Congress's to delegate as it pleases, id. at 89-90. 
Judge Weinstein's purpose is to develop ideal rule-making procedures; because Judge 
Weinstein is more concerned in his book with efficiency than constitutional propriety, the loca-
tion of the rule-making power is less relevant for him than it must be for us. Consequently, his 
analysis of this delegation question is brief and may simply reflect rather than justify the now 
popular assumption that the rule-making power is ultimately legislative. See note 58 i,!fra and 
accompanying text. To support his conclusion that Congress may delegate the power, Judge 
Weinstein relies primarily upon Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) 1 (1825), and Sib-
bach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. I (1941), and secondarily upon Bank of United States v. 
Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 151 (1825), and Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329 (1835). 
J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 89-91. 
However, this authority appears inappropriate. First, Judge Weinstein primarily empha-
sizes Chief Justice Marshall's language in Wayman, which, Judge Weinstein argues, acknowl-
edges that the rule-making power is Congress's. Id. at 89. But Chief Justice Marshall's 
language addressed congressional power vis-a-vis the states (federalism) and is therefore irrele-
vant to the Court/Congress (separation of powers) question. Chief Justice Marshall specifi-
cally denied the possibility of congressional delegation later in the opinion: "It will not be 
contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which 
are strictly and exclusively legislative." 23 U.S. (IO Wheat.) at 42-43. Second, reliance upon 
Sihhach suffers from similar difficulties, mention of which is best postponed until the discus-
sion of Sihhach in text at notes 77-79 i,!fra. Third, Halstead actually reaches the opposite 
conclusion-that the rule-making power is a judicial one. See text at note 68 i,!fra. Finally, 
Beers simply restates the Wayman opinion, which, it has just been argued, does not support 
exclusive congressional control. 
· 43. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S, 227, 240 (1937). 
44. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1793). 
45. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 
(1911). Judge Weinstein acknowledges that the justiciability doctrine and the prohibition 
against advisory opinions are barriers to judicial rule-making, J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 
44-53, but he argues that these barriers may be surmounted since they lessen with the needs of 
the situation. Although such an analysis may be sufficient for purposes of investigating possi-
ble reforms of the rule-making procedure, it is of little aid in describing the Constitution's 
allocation of rule-making authority as that allocation has come to be construed. Judge Wein-
stein believes the advisory-opinion rule is ambiguous and cites some early examples in which 
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The alternative and convincing resolution of the conflict is that 
the power to establish rules of judicial procedure falls within the ju-
dicial power granted by article Ill, section 1. That power, it may be 
argued, includes all powers necessary for a final adjudication of 
cases, including the authority to establish the procedures necessary 
for such adjudication. Under this theory, the Court receives the 
power to promulgate rules directly from the Constitution-that 
power is independent of enabling legislation and is unaffected by the 
rule against advisory opinions. 
If judicial rule-making power does fl.ow directly from article III, 
the Court would be obligated to protect that constitutional power 
from legislative infringement. That the Court has not done so, that it 
has allowed Congress to control some aspects of judicial rule-mak-
ing, suggests that the Court believes the Constitution must also have 
created some legislative power over rule-making. This in turn sug-
gests that rule-making is a shared power. How, then, should the 
rule-making power be allocated? An analogy can be found in the 
power over jurisdiction. 
C. The Analogy to the Power over Jurisdiction: The Primarily 
Adjudicative Test 
Congress defines the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts by 
virtue of article Ill, section 1, and of article I, section 8, which au-
thorize it to "ordain and establish" such courts. Under article Ill, 
section 2, Congress may make "Exceptions" to and "Regulations" 
for the appellate power of the Supreme Court. The Court has inter-
preted these clauses as giving Congress extensive control over juris-
diction. It has held that the lower courts' jurisdiction depends upon 
affirmative congressional grants46 and that Congress may decide 
which kinds of courts hear which cases.47 Congress's control over 
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is less certain. By controlling the 
kinds of cases that may begin in the lower courts, Congress can affect 
the kinds of cases that reach the Court. The Court may not by itself 
enlarge the jurisdiction of the judiciary.48 A Reconstruction-period 
case, Ex parte McCardle, held that Congress could directly limit the 
the Court or individual Justices gave opinions outside the context of a specific case. Yet he 
admits that such opinions might now be impossible given the development of the advisory-
opinion rule. This Note, therefore, cannot simply dismiss the rule as ambiguous, but must try 
to devise a coherent theory which reconciles the advisory-opinion rule with the judicial rule-
making that has occurred. 
46. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962) (plurality opinion); McIntire v. 
Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 503, 504 (1813). 
47. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236,245 
(1845). 
48. Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 344 U.S. 178 
(1952). 
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Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by preventing it from taking 
appeals of habeas corpus proceedings from the lower federal 
courts.49 
However, there are limits to Congress's control of the Court's ju-
risdiction. For example, not only has McCardle been discredited,50 
but United States v. Klein,51 decided shortly after McCardle, held 
that Congress's power could not be used to impose a rule of decision 
on the Court. Congress may not place judicial power in bodies other 
than the judiciary,52 it may not prevent the courts from making in-
dependent decisions,53 nor may the courts themselves assume nonju-
dicial power.54 
Underlying the holdings in all these cases is the proposition th;it 
courts exclusively control all powers associated primarily with the 
adjudication of cases. The test for determining when power over ju-
risdiction is to be reserved for the courts is whether that power is 
necessary for an impartial adjudication. Under this test, broader so-
cial-policy judgments which are not necessary to the adjudication of 
particular cases-such as whether the federal government should be-
come involved in a given area-are left to Congress. But once Con-
gress has, through legislation, indicated its decision that the federal 
government should become involved, the adjudication of cases 
under such legislation must be left to the judiciary.55 
The primarily adjudicative test emerging from the jurisdiction 
cases is a functional one-the allocation of power over a jurisdic-
tional issue turns on whether that issue is associated with the pri-
49. 74 U.S. (I Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). 
50. Both the plurality and dissent in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), referred 
to McCardle in dictum. Justice Harlan's plurality opinion concluded that at best Mccardle 
must be narrowly read, 370 U.S. at 568, while Justice Douglas in dissent doubted that 
McCardle could "command a majority view today," 370 U.S. at 605 n.11. 
51. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (invalidating a congressional attempt to prevent the 
Court from reviewing a legislative reversal of the Court's earlier interpretations of a presiden-
tial pardon). 
52. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 578 (1933) (when a controversy requires 
the exercise of the judicial power defined by article III, jurisdiction can only be conferred on 
courts established by virtue of that article); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement 
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856) (Congress can neither withdraw from judicial cogni-
zance any matter which is the subject of a suit nor can it bring under the judicial power a 
matter which is not a subject for judicial determination). 
53. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) (law declared unconstitu-
tional because it attempted to prescribe for the judiciary the effect to be given to a presidential 
pardon, thereby invading the province of the judiciary); Payne v. Griffin, 51 F. Supp. 588,591 
(M.D. Ga. 1943) (while Congress can determine what cases a court may try, it cannot direct 
what law shall control the decision). 
54. See Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974) (refusing to approve a consent 
decree calling for the appointment of a second Special Master because in supervising execution 
of the decree the court would be more arbitral than judicial). 
55. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 
(1856). 
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mary function of the judicial branch (adjudicating cases by applying 
the law to their facts) or of the legislative branch (deciding what the 
law will be). This Note submits that this test is equally applicable to 
allocating ultimate control over the shared power to make rules.56 
The power over jurisdiction is the best source of guidance because it 
is the only other area in which the two branches have had to work 
out a system for harmonizing conflicting grants of power under arti-
cle I and article III. Further, since Congress has occasionally at-
tempted to control in detail the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
there is a rich and informative collection of decisional law in the 
area. 
As in the jurisdiction area, this test must be applied case by case. 
Some kinds of rules, such as statutes of limitations, serve non-adjudi-
cative functions; others, such as those establishing methods of plead-
ing, may be purely adjudicative. If a rule contains elements of both, 
its primary function must be ascertained.57 
' D. The Primarily Adjudicative Test and the Historical Exercise of 
the Rule-Making Power 
Because the courts have historically made rules pursuant to en-
abling legislation, while Congress has made them on its own author-
ity, commentators and courts have often assumed that the rule-
making power is exclusively legislative.58 Each step of that power's 
history, however, reveals that, while Congress sometimes appears to 
exercise exclusive rule-making power, the power has in fact been 
shared between the two branches in accordance with the primarily 
adjudicative test. 
The first Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, which stated 
that the "courts of the United States shall have power ... to make 
and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting [ of] busi-
ness in the said courts."59 If this statute delegated a power that ulti-
56. The power to define the federal courts' jurisdiction does have one significant difference 
from the power over rule-making. Article III, § 2, of the Constitution explicitly grants power 
over jurisdiction to Congress, but there is no similar grant regarding rule-making. However, 
the effect of this difference, if any, should be to make legislative power weaker in the rule-
making area, which strengthens the conclusion reached in this part of the text. The important 
similarity of shared legislative and judicial power remains. 
57. The primary function of the privilege rules is analyzed in text at notes 87-91 iefra. 
58. Such an assumption is vital to the holdings in casc:s such as United States v. Owens, 
424 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (congressional language of FED. R. EvJD. 501 controls 
decisions of federal courts and thus overturns all specific privilege decisions in the proposed 
rules), and the cases rejecting the Proposed Rules cited in note 150 iefra. Professor Thomas 
Krattenmaker, too, apparently assumes there is absolute legislative supremacy over rule-mak-
ing, since he consults primarily the legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in 
deciding what the federal privilege law is. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613 (1976). See also 
note 42 supra. 
59. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, I Stat. 73, 83. 
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mately resides in Congress, then it would be a mandate for the courts 
to exercise a nonjudicial power. Such a mandate would conflict with 
the rule against advisory opinions.60 It must, then, have been merely 
a congressional acknowledgement or clarification of the Court's in-
dependent rule-making power.61 
Only five days after passing the Judiciary Act, Congress enacted 
the Process Act of 1789, which ordered federal courts to- follow the 
process procedures of the states in which they sat.62 Although Con-
gress returned the power to establish process procedures to the fed-
eral courts in the Process Acts of 179263 and 1793, 64 the three Process 
Acts taken together suggest that Congress assumed that it had the 
power to delegate at least some procedural rule-making authority. 
Since the Supreme Court soon conceded that Congress had the 
power to delegate rule-making authority,65 both Congress and the 
Court early recognized some congressional rule-making power.66 
However, the first Process Act merely subjugated the federal courts' 
rule-making to the states' rule-making rather than to a federal stat-
ute. Thus, Congress's concern was federalism-in passing the Proc-
ess Acts it made a policy decision between state and federal law. 
The first Process Act was a decision that federal courts should not 
establish process procedures; the second and third reversed that deci-
sion. Under the primarily adjudicative test, this is a substantive pol-
icy decision best made by Congress. The decision to place the power 
to establish process procedures in the states rather than in the federal 
courts, or vice versa, is distinguishable from a decision that this 
power rests in Congress itself, and it was the former decision which 
Congress made. 
The Supreme Court's holdings on the Process Acts support the 
theory developed in the preceding paragraph that the Acts only rep-
resented Congress's resolution of federalism· issues. In 1825, the 
Court acknowledged Congress's power to make the federalism deci-
sion expressed in the Process Act of 1793.67 That same year, the 
Court considered the argument that the Act's grant of rule-making 
60. See text at notes 38-45 supra. 
61. Other portions of the act contained just acknowledgements or clarifications. For exam-
ple, § 9 granted the federal courts "exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of 
all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States." 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, I Stat. 73 (footnote omitted). Such power clearly was granted 
the federal courts by article III. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). 
62. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, I Stat. 93. 
63. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, I Stat. 275. 
64. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, I Stat. 333. · 
65. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (JO Wheat.) I (1825). But see note 42 supra. 
66. Even the most avid proponents of judicial rule-making concede the existence of some 
legislative rule-making power. See note 26 supra. 
67. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (JO Wheat.) I (1825). 
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power to the federal courts unconstitutionally delegated legislative 
power. The Court stated that that power was judicial, subject to a 
legislative check: "Congress might regulate the whole practice of the 
courts, if it was deemed expedient so to do: but this power is vested 
in the courts; and it never has occurred to any one, that it was a 
delegation of legislative power."68 
Nor did the Court's behavior through the rest of the nineteenth 
century fail to accord with the "primarily adjudicative" test. In that 
century, the Court established rules of procedure69 but yielded to 
Congress on the federalism decision embodied in the Conformity 
Act of 1872.70 
The modem era of rule-making began in 1934, when Congress 
replaced the Conformity Act with the Rules Enabling Act.71 That 
Act provides that the Supreme Court "shall have the power" to 
make rules of procedure for the federal courts in civil cases but that 
"[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right."72 Rules do not take effect until ninety days after they are 
reported to Congress.73 Generally, the Rules Enabling Act follows 
the pattern of the Process Acts: Congress made the federalism deci-
sion that rules· shall be made by the national government. 
However, the last two paragraphs of the Act, which ban substan-
tive changes and prevent proposed rules from going into effect until 
Congress has the opportunity to review them, have been taken to 
suggest that Congress has delegated merely the power to propose 
rules. Acording to this interpretation, congressional approval, even 
if only tacit, is required to establish rules.74 Proponents of this posi-
tion rely not only on the language of the Act, but on language in 
68. Bank of United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 61 (1825). The part of the 
quoted sentence before the colon is ambiguous and might be read to suggest that rule-making 
power is exclusively congressional. Such a reading is not required, however. First, in ll(J/slead 
and its companion case, Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) I (1825), the Court was 
speaking in the context of a conflict between state and federal court practices. Thus, the Court 
was confirming that Congress might require that federal court procedures conform to state 
procedures. See text following note 78 infra. Second, if the ambiguous portion is not to contra-
dict the clear purport of the second half of the sentence, it must be taken to be speaking of a 
practical capacity of Congress to regulate the courts and a constilulional decision that such 
regµlation would not be "expedient." 
69. A brief but thorough history of these practices can be found in J. WEINSTEIN, supra 
note 22, at 60-64. 
70. Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197. The Act required that federal court 
procedures conform with state procedures. Rules of evidence were specifically exempted from 
this requirement and were to be determined by federal law. Under the theory developed by 
this Note, this should be suffiqient to empower the courts to make evidence decisions, as they 
later did (see cases cited in note 80 infra). 
71. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ I, 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1976)). 
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976) (the full text of this section is reproduced in note 7 supra), 
73. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1976). 
74. See cases cited in note 150 infra. 
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cases in which the Supreme Court has considered challenges to the 
Federal Rules ·of Civil Procedµre. The two most prominent exam-
ples are Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 75 and Hanna v. Pfumer.76 In 
Sibbach, for instance, the Court said, "Congress has undoubted 
power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and 
may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts 
authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitu-
tion of the United States."77 
There are three problems with citing such language in order to 
prove that Congress has exclusive rule-making power. First, the En-
abling Act's language is more consistent with the primarily adjudica-
tive theory. Both the provision requiring reporting to Congress and 
the ban against substantive changes are mechanisms which permit 
Congress to inspect rules that require substantive policy decisions. 
Moreover, that the clause establishes a review period but requires no 
congressional action to give the rules authority suggests that it was 
simply intended to allow Congress to exercise its check against 
changes in substantive policy. 
Second, the challenges to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Sibbach and Hanna concerned the validity of the Rules vis-a-vis 
contrary state practices.78 Since such federalism questions involve 
policy choices that rest with Congress, the Court focussed on con-
gressional power over rule-making. In other words, those cases dis-
cussed federalism questions rather than questions concerning 
separation of powers, and the frequently cited passages in them are, 
as to the separation-of-powers issue, dicta and no more. 
Third, if the Rules Enabling Act simply empowers the courts to 
make proposals, it conflicts with the rule against advisory opinions. 
In considering a regulatory scheme that called for review by the 
Court subject to final action by the President, the Court concluded 
that rendering a judicial decision "which has only the force of a rec-
ommendation . . . would be to render an advisory opinion in its 
most obnoxious form."79 In sum, the better interpretation of the 
Rules Enabling Act is that it allows Congress to review any substan-
tive issues implicated by a procedural rule, but that it also does not 
infringe on the judiciary's power to make by itself any primarily ad-
judicative rules. 
75. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
76. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
77. 312 U.S. at 9-10. 
78. See 312 U.S. at 7; 380 U.S. at 462. 
79. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948). 
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II. RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The history of the rule-making power, we have seen, reveals that 
it is shared between the legislature and the judiciary. This Note next 
examines the most recent example of that sharing-the Proposed 
Rules of Evidence-in order to discover what authority the Proposed 
Rules on privileges have. 
A. Historical Practice 
Both the legislature and the judiciary have made rules of evi-
dence for well over one-hundred years.80 Initially, Congress was re-
luctant to do so;81 when it began to write rules of evidence, it did so 
only in specific instances rather than by promulgating general 
rules.82 The Court, on the other hand, has freely decided questions 
of evidence in individual cases without legislative authorization.83 
By the beginning of this century the decisions in Funk v. United 
States84 and United States v. Wo!fle85 had established that the judi-
cial branch could decide questions of evidence, including those con-
cerning privileges, as a matter of federal common law. 
Whether the Court should promulgate rules of evidence through 
a rule-making procedure, rather than case by case, is, of course, an-
other question,86 and rules on privileges present unique considera-
tions. While other rules of evidence are primarily aimed at reaching 
the truth in a trial by ensuring that evidence is reliable,87 privilege 
rules serve policy considerations external to the actual trial process. 88 
80. Specific congressional evidence rules were upheld in Ex parle Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 
(1885), and Ogden v. Saunders, 26 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 (1827). 
The Court adopted rules of evidence case by case in Wolfie v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 
(1934); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); United States v. Murphy, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 
203 (1842); and United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827). However, not until 
Wo!fle and Funk did the Court explicitly announce its authority to establish rules of evidence. 
81. See, e.g., Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (discussed in note 70 supra) 
exempting evidence rules from the conformity requirement. 
82. See, e.g., Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (setting burden of proof standards for 
certain federal criminal cases). 
83. See cases cited in the second paragraph of note 80 supra. 
84. 290 U.S. 371 (1933). 
85. 291 U.S. 7 (1934). 
86. Judge Weinstein suggests that rule-making ought not replace common-law decisions 
since, unlike rule-making decisions, common-law decisions are the result of "aci;retion," the 
slow movement which allows the Court to learn from the mistakes and experience of all the 
federal courts. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 14-15. Yet whenever the Supreme Court 
makes a ruling over a specific case, the "accretion" may then end. Even if it does not, the 
superiority of "accretion" over rules is not at all apparent. First, the rule-makers have all past 
cases available for consideration. Second, rule-making benefits from many different points of 
view since rules are drafted by an advisory committee which consists of and consults with 
people of varied experience and outlook. 
87. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2175 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
88. Id at § 2285. 
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That difference might suggest that only Congress can write privilege 
rules.89 However, the decision to grant a privilege is not simply a 
decision to protect certain relationships by preserving the confidenti-
ality of information communicated within them. Rather, it involves 
a balancing of the value of that goal-a value external to the trial 
process-with the value of ensuring that courts hear the most relia-
ble available evidence-a value internal to the trial process.90 Al-
though it is within Congress's purview to determine which 
relationships deserve protection, it is within the courts' to determine 
whether they will decide cases without admitting evidence that may 
be highly relevant.91 Thus, neither branch should have exclusive 
power to write rules governing privileges. According to the primar-
ily adjudicative test, . then, the authority of the Proposed Rules on 
privileges turns on whether Congress in its reaction to them was 
making substantive policy judgments and thereby commanding judi-
cial obedience. The legislative history of rule 501 indicates that it 
was not. 
B. The Legislative History of Rule 501 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, as we have seen, instructs the 
courts to decide questions of privilege by using "the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted . . . in the light of reason 
and experience." That language was taken from former Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2692 at the suggestion of Judge 
Friendly.93 Congressional explanations that the rule was intended to 
leave the law on privileges in "its current condition"94 or "present 
state,"95 to be developed by the courts on a "case-by-case basis,"96 
hardly clarify Congress's reasons for rejecting the rules proposed by 
the Supreme Court. Crucially, the events leading up to the adoption 
of rule 501 and the generality of its language indicate that, in re-
jecting the Supreme Court's specific Proposed Rules on privileges, 
Congress was motivated by time pressures and political imperatives 
rather than by a desire to protect its policy judgments. 
In establishing nine and only nine specific privileges97 the Pro-
89. See, e.g., Krattenmaker, supra note 58; Note, supra note 33, at 1070-75. 
90. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972). 
91. If the evidence were not relevant, the privilege holder would be able to exclude it for 
precisely that reason. See FED. R. Evm. 402 & 403. 
92. 327 U.S. 821, 852 (1946). See Krattenmaker, supra note 58, at 643-45. 
93. Hearings on Proposed Rules if Evidence Btjore the Special Subcomm. on Reform if 
Federal Criminal Laws efthe House Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 247 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. 
94. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. 
95. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. 
96. SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 13. 
97. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
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posed Rules determined which confidential relationships would be 
protected and which would not. Because this determination in-
volved complex and politically difficult questions, the ninety-day pe-
riod that the Rules Enabling Act provided before the Proposed 
Rules would take effect was too short to permit a full discussion of 
those questions. Thus, Congress's response to the Proposed Rules 
began with Senate Resolution S. 583,98 which extended that time pe-
riod to the end of the session.99 Subsequently, both houses voted for 
an indefinite postponement of the date on which the Proposed Rules 
would become eff ective.100 
Having decided to postpone that date, Congress next faced a fed-
eralism issue: even if the Supreme Court's rules were to be adopted 
in cases heard in the federal courts under federal-question jurisdic-
tion, should they be adopted in cases heard under diversity jurisdic-
tion? In the latter situation, adopting the Proposed Rules would 
subordinate state law on privilege to federal law. Deciding that the 
states' interest in the policies underlying privileges outweighed the 
federal interest in uniform rules, Congress incorporated state law for 
diversity cases.101 The final reports of both houses emphasized their 
concern with the federalism issue. In the House Report, Representa-
tive Hungate said that this concern was the primary reason for Con-
gress's intervention in the privilege sections of the Proposed Rules. 102 
The Senate's explanation of its rejection of the Proposed Rules on 
privilege stressed even more forcefully that concern. 103 Thus, in re-
jecting the Supreme Court's proposals for diversity cases, Congress 
was deciding that the federal government should not become in-
volved in a certain area. 104 Under the primarily adjudicative test 
this is a decision which can properly be made by Congress and 
which must be respected by the courts. 
Still, this does not explain Congress's rejection of the Proposed 
Rules in federal-question cases. Indeed, the Conference Committee 
Report specifically concluded that, because of important federal con-
cerns, 105 federal law on privileges should apply in such cases. Three 
98. It was presented by Sen. Ervin on Jan. 29, 1973, 119 CONG. REC. 2395, and passed by 
the Senate on Feb. 7, 1973, 119 CONG. REC. 3755. 
99. Comments by both House Subcommittee members and witnesses at House hearings 
show that shortness of the time period for considering the Proposed Rules was one of the most 
important reasons for delaying their effective date. See Hearings on Federal Rules of Evidence 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) (hereinafter cited as 
Senate Hearings] (comments of Rep. Hungate); House Hearings, supra note 93, at 104-05 (tes-
timony of several New York Bar Association members). 
100. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. 
101. Proposed Rules SOI, 56 F.R.D. at 230, reprinted in text at note 17 supra. 
102. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 95, at 7-8. 
103. SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 607. 
104. For a discussion of power over jurisdiction, see text at note 55 supra. 
105. H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1974). Although Congress recognized 
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explanations of that rejection are possible. First, Congress might 
have been making a substantive policy decision to reject the judg-
ments embodied in the Proposed Rules. Second, Congress might 
have been objecting to codification but not to the substance of the 
rules. Third, given the delay over the federalism issue and given the 
even greater delay consideration of the interests of politically diverse 
groups would have caused, Congress might have succumbed to the 
pressures of time and to the complexity of the political situation it 
faced. 
The legislative history shows that the first explanation-that 
Congress deliberately rejected the Court's decisions-is inaccurate. 
Indeed, Congress consciously avoided such a judgment. The Senate 
Report cautioned, in regard to rule 501: 
It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as 
to privileges, the action of Congress should not be understood as disap-
proving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or 
any other of the enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme 
Court rules. Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting the 
view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential rela-
tionship and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. 106 
This language, and the provision requiring express congressional 
approval of any amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 107 
might seem to support the second explanation-that Congress ob-
jected to codification 108-as might Congress's unwillingness to sub-
stitute its own specific rules for the Court's. This explanation, 
however, also fails. Although there were members of Congi:ess109 
and witnesses110 at the congressional hearings who opposed codifi-
that the states' privilege laws represented substantive decisions, it was also concerned about the 
effect state privilege laws could have on federal policies. Giving a state's decision priority over 
a federal privilege decision would subjugate the national judiciary to the decisions of the state 
governments in a way which could jeopardize other federal policies. For example, a state's 
employer-employee privilege regarding wages could impede federal revenue collection en-
forcement. 
On the other hand, Congress was also sensitive to the need for uniformity in privilege law. 
Id. A split between federal question and diversity cases was thought the best compromise, 
since it would keep the privilege laws applicable to a given cause of action uniform across the 
different forums while still protecting federal policies from state encroachment. 
106. SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 13. 
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976). See text at note 18 supra. 
108. This is Professor Krattenmaker's thesis, supra note 58, at 640-46. It takes the com-
ments of a few individuals (including witnesses who were not even members of Congress) as 
the voice of the whole Congress. See note 110 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
109. E.g., Rep. Holtzman, 120 CONG. REc. 1415 (1974); Rep. Podell, House Hearings, 
supra note 93, at 5-7. 
110. E.g., Alvin Hellerstein, Francis Koch, and Joseph McLaughlin (representing the New 
York Bar Association), House Hearings, supra note 93, at 114-15; Charles Halpern and George 
Frampton (representing the Washington Council of Lawyers), id. at 160-63; E. Barrett Pretty-
man (by letter, representing the District of Columbia Bar), id. at 244-45; Judge Friendly, id. at 
246. 
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cation of the privilege rules, they were part of that minority which 
also rejected codification of any rules of evidence: 111 there is no evi-
dence that their views on codification represented the majority opin-
ion in Congress.112 On the contrary, the support in committee 
discussions and in the floor debate for a uniform set of rules of evi-
dence was overwhelming. 113 
In light of this support for uniform rules of evidence, the theory 
that uniformity was viewed as undesirable in the privilege area is 
plausible only if some factor distinguished rules on privilege from 
other rules of evidence. Rules on privilege do present unique con-
siderations, because they embody judgments on policy concerns re-
lated to matters external to the judicial process. 114 However, 
uniformity is crucial in carrying out the substantive policies embod-
ied in privileges; non-uniform results weaken such policies. Privi-
leges encourage confidential communication between parties in 
certain relationshipsm by guaranteeing that the privileged party can 
prevent the other party from disclosing the communication as evi-
dence against him. The degree of encouragement will vary directly 
with the reliability of the guarantee. If communications are pro-
tected in one jurisdiction, not protected in another, and in doubt in 
still another, there can be no certainty that the privilege will be pro-
tected in the circuit where a suit may arise, and the most prudent 
action will be to refrain from all such communications. Thus, non-
uniformity may make the most protective version of a rule only as 
strong as the least protective. 116 In short, uniformity of rules of priv-
ilege is no less desirable than uniformity of other rules of evidence. 
11 l. See sources cited in notes 109-IO supra. Judge Friendly's testimony is illustrative: 
"While I do disagree with many details of the proposed rules, my basic position is that it is 
now undesirable to have a Federal Code of Evidence in any form." House Hearings, supra 
note 93, at 246. 
112. For example, Rep. Holtzman dissented to the House Report. House REPORT, supra 
note 95, at 27-29. 
113. For example, the House Report began with the statement: "The purpose of this legis-
lation is to provide a uniform code of evidence for use in the Federal courts." House REPORT, 
supra note 95, at l. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 8; 120 CONG, Rec. 40076 
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Hruska); 120 CONG. REc. 37084 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft); House 
REPORT, supra note 95, at 4 (remarks of Rep. Hungate); 120 CONG. Rec. 1416-17 (1974) (re-
marks of Rep. Mayne); 120 CONG. REC. 1411-12 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Rodino); 120 CONG, 
REc. 1413 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Smith); 120 CONG. REC. 40891-92 (1974) (remarks of Rep. 
Zion). 
114. See text at notes 87-91 supra. Indeed, it may be for this reason that Congress decided 
to leave decisions concerning privilege to state law in diversity cases. 
115. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 87, at § 2285. 
116. It might be argued that Congress was responding to those special interest groups de-
manding privilege protection for their professions by leaving the door open for the courts to 
create new privileges. See notes 122-24 i,!fra and accompanying text. However, since a privi-
lege must be uniformly accepted to provide any true benefit to a profession, the disuniformity 
resulting from Congress's action leaves such a possibility too speculative to be confidently 
accepted. 
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Although by virtue of section 583, Congress had unlimited time 
to review the Proposed Rules, 117 Representative Hungate118 and 
Senator Hruska, 119 as they introduced those rules to their respective 
houses, expressed the fear that postponing the decision to enact the 
Federal Rules of Evidence until the next session might sidetrack that 
decision indefinitely. Thus, there was a sense of urgency about act-
ing before adjournment. As the House vote to foreclose debate on 
the rules on privilege to avoid indefinite delay demonstrates, 120 it 
was the controversy over those rules that threatened to block adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
While Congress was able to avoid much debate over many of the 
other rules either by adopting the Court's proposals verbatim or by 
making only minor technical changes, 121 in deciding to reject the 
proposals on privilege in diversity cases to accommodate the concern 
over federalism, Congress had assumed direct control over, and thus 
responsibility for, the substance of those rules. Congress quickly 
found itself besieged by interest groups seeking other substantive 
changes. Although most of the rules were important and divided the 
legal community, 122 each decision whether to include a particular 
privilege directly affected other politically powerful special-interest 
groups as well. 123 Representative Hungate summarized the problem: 
"People did not like the changes being made; when you open this up, 
the social workers and the piano tuners want a privilege. It is a very 
difficult matter, so we left that where it is for now." 124 
Congress sought a compromise which, because it neither in-
cluded nor excluded any particular profession, would be acceptable 
to all and would prevent an indefinite delay in passing the entire set 
of rules. Those who drafted rule 501 emphasized that it was only a 
stopgap, not the ultimate solution to the problem. 125 Thus, the only 
policy judgment that can be said to have motivated the adoption of 
rule 501 was the desire to delay a policy judgment; there is no evi-
dence that the rule was designed to serve any other extra-judicial 
policy. 
117. See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text. 
I 18. 120 CONG. REC. 40890 (1974). 
119. 120 CONG. REC. 40069 (1974). 
120. 120 CONG. REC. 1410 (1974). 
121. For a list su=arizing the congressional changes, see P. ROTHSTEIN (Supp. 1974), 
supra note 4, at 57-65. 
122. For examples of division of legal opinion, see the co=ents of various members of 
the bar throughout House Hearings, supra note 93, and Rep. Holtzman's dissent to the House 
Report, 120 CONG. REC. 1415 (1974). 
123. For a list of these special interest groups, see Krattenmaker, supra note 58, at 641 
n.196, 642 nn. 203-10. 
124. Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 6. 
125. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 40069 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hruska); 120 CONG. REC. 
40890 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate). 
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III. THE STANDARD OF DEFERENCE GIVEN JUDICIALLY 
PROMULGATED RULES 
The Supreme Court has yet to decide what authority, if any, 
should be given the Proposed Rules. 126 If Congress's decision to re-
ject the Proposed Rules on privileges had been primarily based on 
policy concerns that outweighed the courts' interest in control over 
their own adjudicative procedures, then, under the primarily adjudi-
cative test, the Proposed Rules would not affect the courts' resolu-
tions of privilege issues in federal-question cases. 127 However, if, as 
this Note has argued, that decision was reached merely to avoid 
making policy judgments and to return the responsibility for making 
such judgments to the courts, then the Proposed Rules should be 
afforded the same weight as a set of rules which Congress had simply 
allowed to go into effect. 
A. By the Supreme Court 
Because the Supreme Court promulgated these rules, it is not 
precluded from reconsidering whether to follow them. The Court 
can overrule its own prior holdings, and since judicial rules are not 
written in the context of a particular case, they lack even the author-
126. The Court had the opportunity to consider the Proposed Rules in Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), where, in the context of a claim that the fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination had been violated, the attorney-client privilege became relevant. 
Citing a series of lower court decisions and the consensus of the treatises, the Court gave 
passing attention to the attorney-client privilege, remarking that it existed in the federal courts. 
425 U.S. at 402-03. The attorney-client privilege was an uncontroversial privilege embodied in 
Proposed Rule 503. 56 F.R.D. at 235-40. On one hand, since the Court did not cite the Pro-
posed Rules as authority, one might infer that they are to be disregarded. On the other hand, 
since the attorney-client privilege was uncontroversial, and since Proposed Rule 503 simply 
codified existing law, there was no need to determine the authority of the Proposed Rules, In 
fact, the common law of attorney-client privilege is so clearly developed that reference to the 
Rules was unnecessary. For example, in Fisher, the Court quoted FED. R. Evm. 501, but 
continued, "Thus, whether or not Rule 501 applies to this case, the attorney-client privilege 
issue is governed by the principles and authorities" of the case law and the consensus of the 
treatises. 425 U.S. at 402 n.8. 
127. It should be noted that this position conflicts with that taken by the congressional 
amendments to the Rules Enabling Act. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2(2)(1), 88 
Stat. 1948 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976)) (quoted in text at note 18 supra). As argued in 
the preceding Part, such a limitation is beyond the reach of congressional power over rule-
making. 
As noted in that Part, article Ill's grant of judicial power provides the judiciary with the 
power to make rules that do not conflict with substantive policy decisions made by Congress. 
Congress cannot, by legislation, remove that power from the courts. Yet the broad sweep of 
these amendments attempts to do just that. 
The restriction that the amendment purports to impose is particularly repugnant under 
constitutional analysis because it is aimed only at controlling the procedure by which the 
Court makes privilege decisions. It leaves the Court the power to make such decisions case by 
case, but orders the Court to use a rule-making procedure to make those decisions. Such a 
system fails to preserve substantive issues for the Congress, while at the same time it infringes 
on the judiciary's power to regulate its own procedures. 
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ity of stare decisis. 128 Considering this issue as it pertained to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court concluded in Mississippi 
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree: "The fact that this Court promulgated 
the rules as formulated and recommended by the Advisory Commit-
tee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning, or 
consistency." 129 In Murphree, however, the Court upheld the chal-
lenged rule; 130 indeed, it has never invalidated such a rule. 131 
The Proposed Rules on privileges differ, of course, from the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in that Congress has not approved 
them. Thus, the Court might be more willing to question one of the 
Proposed Rules if it were challenged. However, the Court has al-
ready considered the policy decisions embodied in the Proposed 
Rules, 132 and a congressional stalemate is insufficient reason for the 
Court to re-evaluate those decisions. 
B. By the Lower Federal Courts 
The lower courts have, of course, consistently held themselves 
bound by judicially promulgated rules which have been implicitly 
approved by Congress. 133 Presented with the unprecedented situa-
tion that the Proposed Rules of Evidence were not approved by Con-
gress; that some courts had already relied on portions of the 
Proposed Rules in the interim between their promulgation by the 
Court and their rejection by Congress;134 and that there has been no 
128. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 914-15. 
129. 326 U.S. 438,444 (1946). Justices Black and Douglas denied this proposition in mem-
oranda dissenting from various Court-made amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 398 U.S. 979 (1970); 383 U.S. 1089 (1966); 374 U.S. 865 (1963); 368 U.S. 1012 (1961). 
They contended that the Court would feel bound in some degree by such rules to avoid "the 
embarrassment of having to sit in judgment of the constitutionality of rules which [the Court 
has] approved and which as applied in given situations might have to be declared invalid." 
374 U.S. at 870. 
130. 326 U.S. at 445-46. 
131. There are two possible reasons why the Court has consistently followed its own rules. 
First, before the Court promulgates such rules, it is presumably satisfied that the rules are 
those it supports. Second, Congress has hitherto always implicitly approved the rules, see text 
at note 20 supra, and such legislative concurrence has given the rules added authority. Both 
reasons are given in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (footnote omitted): 
[T]he court has been instructed to apply the Fedr.ral Rule [of Civil Procedure], and can 
refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their 
prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the En-
abling Act nor constitutional restrictions. 
132. The Court demanded several drafts of the Proposed Rules of Evidence before finally 
promulgating them. See text at notes 2-6 supra. 
133. Couch v. United States, 235 F.2d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1956); John R. Alley & Co. v. 
Federal Natl. Bank, 124 F.2d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 1942); Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 
518, 527 (E.D.S.C. 1948); C.J. Weiland & Son Dairy Prods. Co. v. Wickard, 4 F.R.D. 250, 252 
(E.D. Wis. 1945); Westland Oil Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 F.R.D. 55, 56 (D.N.D. 
1943); Kuenzel v. Universal Carloading & Distrib. Co., 29 F. Supp. 407,409 (E.D. Pa. 1939); 
American Graphophone Co. v. National Phonograph Co., 127 F. 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1904). 
134. See, e.g., United States v. Van Dronen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974) (Proposed Rule 
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guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have responded 
in ways that span virtually the entire spectrum of possible solutions. 
At one end of the spectrum are courts that have given great 
weighf to the Proposed Rules. As Judge Weinstein explained in 
United States v. Mackey: 
Despite their deletion by Congress, the privilege rules promulgated by 
the Supreme Court remain of considerable utility as standards. . . . 
The specific Rules on privilege promulgated by the Supreme Court 
are reflective of "reason and experience." They are the culmination of 
three drafts prepared by an Advisory Committee consisting of judges, 
practicing lawyers and academicians. In its many years of work, the 
Committee considered hundreds of suggestions received in response to 
the circulation of the drafts throughout the legal community. Finally; 
they were adopted by the Supreme Court by an eight to one vote. The 
rule against advisory opinions is only slightly more violated by giving 
weight to this vote than it would have been had Congress not vetoed 
these provisions, and had they become "Rules," rather than "stand-
ards."135 
At the other extreme was the court in United States v. Owens, 
which rejected the Proposed Rules and the precedents based thereon 
because "the Congress abandon[ ed]" them. 136 Courts in between 
have viewed the Proposed Rules as "the best of current thinking in 
the common law 'in the light of reason and experience' " 137 but, ap-
parently, as having no authority of their own; as confirmation of the 
Supreme Court's view that the privileges omitted by the Proposed 
Rules are not constitutionally mandated; 138 as "useful standard[s] 
from which analysis can proceed";139 as "some evidence of 'the prin-
ciples of the common law' . . . [but not] authoritative"; 140 or simply 
as weight to add to other authority. 141 In short, the courts can agree 
on neither the legal authority nor the persuasiveness of the Proposed 
Rules. 
Where the Proposed Rules merely codified a well-established 
federal common-law privilege, of course, courts have consistently re-
tained it. For example, federal courts had always refused to recog-
505); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973) (Proposed Rule 503); United States v. Luther, 
481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973) (Proposed Rule 506); Eutectic Corp. v. Meleo, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (Proposed Rule 503). 
135. 405 F. Supp. 854, 857-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN• 
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 501-20.4 to 20.5 (3d ed. 1977). The relationship of judicial rule-making to 
the constitutional ban against advisory opinions is discussed in text at notes 38-45 supra. 
136. 424 F. Supp. 421, 422-23 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
137. Eutectic Corp. v. Meleo, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 38 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). 
138. United States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1045-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). 
139. United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). 
140. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 522 (D. Conn. 1976). 
141. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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nize a physician-patient privilege. 142 It was omitted from the 
Proposed Rules, 143 and the federal cases decided since the promulga-
tion of the Proposed Rules have also refused to_recognize that privi-
lege.144 
The Proposed Rules, however, did not always merely codify es-
tablished common-law privileges, and, naturally, it is where they did 
not that the problem arises. The greatest potential benefit of the Pro-
posed Rules is that they provided uniform privilege decisions for all 
the federal courts. Such uniformity is, we have seen, critical to privi-
lege law. 145 But confusion over the authority of the Proposed Rules 
threatens to strip them of that advantage. For this policy reason, and 
because the primarily adjudicative test establishes that the authority 
of the Court's rules on privilege in federal-question cases has been 
left intract by Congress, the lower courts' confusion is needless and 
mistaken. 
The Proposed Rules, for instance, departed from established fed-
eral common law by not recognizing the marital confidential-com-
munication privilege. 146 In 1951, the Supreme Court had recognized 
that privilege as applicable in the federal courts. 147 The Advisory 
Committee, however, chose to adopt only the anti-marital facts priv-
ilege in the Proposed Rules. 148 The lower courts that have faced the 
issue since the promulgation of the Proposed Rules appear to con-
tinue to recognize the confidential-communication privilege. 149 
However, the Advisory Committee and Supreme Court decisions to 
eliminate this privilege may mean that such uniformity will be short-
lived. If the courts begin to disagree over this privilege, it will resem-
142. See United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971) (refusing to recognize the 
privilege because it has traditionally been rejected by the federal courts). 
143. See Proposed Rule 504 and accompanying Advisory Committee note, 56 F.R.D. at 
241-44. 
144. See, e.g., In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
Similarly, the Proposed Rules incorporated the so-called "informer's privilege," which is 
part of the federal common law. See Proposed Rule 510 and accompanying Advisory Com-
mittee note, 56 F.R.D. at 255. Post-promulgation decisions have consistently recognized the 
privilege. United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rawlin-
son, 487 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1971); Porta-
Kamp Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Real Estate Bd., 59 
F.R.D. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
145. See text at note I 16 supra. 
146. There are two distinct marital privileges: the anti-marital facts privilege and the confi-
dential-communication privilege. The former allows the privilege holder to prevent liis or her 
spouse from testifying against the privilege holder. The latter protects any communication 
made in confidence between the two spouses and therefore survives a dissolution of the mar-
riage. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 87, at §§ 2333, 2335. 
147. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951). 
148. See Proposed Rule 505 and accompanying Advisory Committee note, 56 F.R.D. at 
244. This Proposed Rule also limited the anti-marital facts privilege to criminal cases. 
149. See, e.g., United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith, 
533 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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ble the areas where the Proposed Rules attempted to resolve ques-
tions left unresolved by the federal common law. There are several 
such areas, 150 but an analysis of one-the anti-marital facts privi-
lege-illustrates the different applications of the Proposed Rules and 
the resultant disuniformity. 
In 1958, the Supreme Court held the anti-marital facts privilege 
applicable in the federal courts. 151 Although the Court held that the 
exceptions to this privilege should be limited, it did not indicate 
which exceptions should be recognized. 152 The Proposed Rules, 
however, did list such exceptions, 153 and since the promulgation of 
the Proposed Rules, three courts have relied on that list to decide 
which exceptions to recognize. 154 However, one court has held that 
rule 501 adopts only the well-recognized common-law exceptions. 155 
Thus, the law on the anti-marital facts privilege is completely un-
resolved. It is to prevent such lack of uniformity, and the resulting 
weakening of federal privileges, that this Note recommends that the 




The legislative history of rule 501 indicates that that rule was 
adopted in response to time pressures rather than to implement pol-
150. Privilege questions left unresolved by the federal common law include: (I) the state-
required-reports privilege, adopted in Proposed Rule 502, 56 F.R.D. at 234 (see In re Grand 
Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1976), hut see United States v. King, 73 
F.R.D. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (disapproving the across-the-board adoption of this privilege in 
the Proposed Rules, but then deciding that even under the Proposed Rules, this privilege 
would not have applied to the particular facts of the instant case)); (2) the extension of the 
attorney-client privilege to include communication to those assisting the attorney, adopted in 
Proposed Rule 503(a)(3), 56 F.R.D. at 236 (see United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d 
Cir. 1975); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973) (dictum); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 
142 (8th Cir. 1972) (relying on the Proposed Rules to make such extensions), hul see United 
States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 151-53 (9th Cir. 1974) (dictum) (rejecting both such an exten-
sion and the authority of the Proposed Rules)); (3) the extension of the attorney-client privilege 
to intra-corporate co=unications made for the purpose of obtaining legal services, adopted 
in Proposed Rule 503(b), 56 F.R.D. at 236 (see Eutectic Corp. v. Meleo, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (accepting the privilege), hut see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508 
(D. Conn. 1976) (rejecting the privilege)); (4) the psychotherapist-patient privilege, adopted in 
Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. at 240 (see Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 574-76 
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (dictum); United States ex rel Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-44 
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (dictum) (adopting the privilege), hut see United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 
752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the privilege)). 
151. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
152. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958). 
153. Proposed Rule 505(c), 56 F.R.D. at 244-45. 
154. United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755-56 (5th Cir. 1977) (relying upon infer-
ence from Advisory Committee note); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(Proposed Rule 505(c)(I)); United States v. Van Dronen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(Proposed Rule 505(c)(2)). 
155. United States v. Owens, 424 F. Supp. 421, 423 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
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icy considerations external to the adjudicative process. Under the 
primarily adjudicative test, such a motive cannot justify vesting this 
congressional action with the power and effect of a legislative veto 
of the Proposed Rules. 
The practice of the federal courts has been to treat judicially 
promulgated rules of procedure as binding. Because Congress has, 
in rule 501, shifted the responsibility for making decisions on privi-
lege to the courts, and because the Proposed Rules receive their au-
thority from the same source-the Supreme Court-as the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, they should also be recognized as binding 
by the lower courts. Such recognition will result in uniformity that 
will enhance the effectiveness of privileges and will provide the 
courts with an efficient way of deciding questions of privilege. 
